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NOTES
LABOR LAW-EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE-GOOD
CAUSE PROVISION ALLOWED. Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hos-
pital, 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987).
Arkansas Children's Hospital dismissed Gail Gladden after
eighteen months of employment. She initially filed suit based upon
the tort of outrage, but amended her complaint to allege that her em-
ployer breached hospital personnel regulations that were incorporated
in her employment contract. Gladden asked the Arkansas Supreme
Court to modify the employment at will doctrine' to enforce a written
employment contract which limits the ability of the employer to dis-
charge an employee,2 even though the employment was for an indefi-
nite term.
Saline County Memorial Hospital employed Loretta Samples as
a nurse. The hospital provided its employees with a policy manual
that dealt with administrative and personnel matters. The manual
listed those specific acts that would subject employees to termination,
although this list was not exclusive. The manual also required two
written warnings and two suspensions without pay in order to dis-
charge for absenteeism. A separate provision in the manual waived
the guarantee of policy manual rights during any probationary period.
The manual did not guarantee continued employment subject to ter-
mination for good cause only, nor did Samples' employment agree-
ment define a definite length of employment. Samples' employer
initially dismissed her for absenteeism. The hospital reinstated Sam-
ples, subject to her acceptance of ninety days of probation; it then
terminated her employment because she refused to accept probation.
Samples filed suit alleging that her dismissal was arbitrary and in bad
faith, and that it breached her contract of employment with the hospi-
1. The employment at will doctrine states that where there exists no definite term of
employment in the employment contract, the contract may be terminated by either the em-
ployer or the employee without liability for breach of contract. I F. MECHEM, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 419-21 (2d ed. 1982).
2. Gladden's employee policy manual stated that employees would be discharged for
misconduct. The handbook did not state that employment would be terminated only for good
cause.
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tal. The Arkansas Supreme Court consolidated Gladden's and Sam-
ples' cases for appeal.
The court dealt with three topics. First, the court expressly over-
ruled St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v. Matthews,3
which held that the employment at will rule4 applied to an employ-
ment agreement which contained a provision against termination ex-
cept for good cause unless the employment was for a definite term.
Second, the court affirmed prior decisions that refused to find an im-
plied good cause provision in employment contracts. Third, the court
announced that where an employee relies upon a personnel manual
provision which forbids termination of employment without cause,
the employment may not be terminated in violation of that provision.6
Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hospital, 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d
501 (1987).
Courts which follow the employment at will doctrine reason that
mutuality is lacking if no definite period of employment is stated in
the agreement.7 The employment at will doctrine states that lack of
mutuality in the employment agreement makes the contract unen-
forceable.8 Under this doctrine, the employer has an unconditional
right to terminate the employment relationship because the employee
is free to quit when he pleases. 9 The most succinct summary of the
employment at will doctrine may be that an employment at will rela-
tionship can be terminated "for a good reason, a bad reason, or no
3. 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902 (1897).
4. See 1 F. MECHEM, supra note 1, at 419-21.
5. 64 Ark. at 406, 42 S.W. at 904-05 (1897). See also Youngdahl, The Erosion of the
Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Arkansas, 40 ARK. L. REV. 545 (1987) for a summary of
previously recognized exceptions to the at will rule in Arkansas.
6. Neither plaintiff in Gladden benefitted by this newly created exception to the at will
rule because neither of the employment contracts or employee policy manuals in these cases
contained an express provision that termination could be only for cause. 292 Ark. 130, 135-36,
728 S.W.2d 501, 505 (1987).
7. Seven states continue to follow the employment at will doctrine: Delaware, Florida,
Louisiana, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wyoming. Youngdahl, supra note 5, at 547
n.14. See, e.g., Landry v. Farmer, 564 F. Supp. 598 (D. R.I. 1983); Avallone v. Wilmington
Medical Center, 553 F. Supp. 931 (D. Del. 1982); Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d
637 (La. App. 1982); Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388
(1983); Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986); Siebken v. Town of Wheatland, 700
P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 1985).
8. 64 Ark. at 408, 42 S.W. at 905.
9. Arkansas has required mutuality of obligations in those instances in which no other
consideration for the contract exists other than a return promise. See, e.g., Tinnon v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 282 F.2d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 1960); Crawford v. General Contract Corp., 174 F.
Supp. 283, 297 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Johnson v. Johnson, 188 Ark. 992, 995, 68 S.W.2d 465, 466
(1934).
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reason at all."'"
Arkansas first followed the employment at will doctrine in 1897
in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v. Matthews." In
that case, an employee was in control of a locomotive that was dam-
aged when the boiler exploded. The company conducted an internal
investigation and discharged the employee. In response to the em-
ployee's wrongful discharge claim the company alleged that the em-
ployee was grossly negligent in allowing the water in the boiler to
reach an unsafe level.' 2 The jury found for the employee. From the
jury's instructions it is apparent that the jury found no negligence in
the operation of the engine and that the employee's discharge violated
his employment contract. 13 The trial court awarded damages for
breach of a provision in the agreement which stated that "[n]o engi-
neer shall be discharged or suspended without just and sufficient
cause. ....'-" The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the trial court and held this provision to be unenforceable absent an
agreement by the employee to work a definite period.' 5
Again, in Petty v. Missouri & Arkansas Railway, 6 the Arkansas
Supreme Court addressed a case in which a locomotive engineer was
discharged from his employment. The employee alleged that his ter-
mination violated an agreement entered into by the railroad and its
employees; the agreement provided for a pretermination hearing. The
employee never received a hearing; and he contended that this omis-
sion amounted to a breach of his contract of employment. I7 The trial
court ruled in favor of the employer. The Arkansas Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the provisions regarding a fair hearing
were enforceable for lack of mutuality of obligation. The majority
opinion admitted that the provision assuring the employee's right to a
hearing could not be enforced without overruling Matthews.18
The Petty court affirmed the decision of the trial court in favor of
the employer because the three year statute of limitations barred the
employee's claim.' 9 However, both the concurring and dissenting jus-
tices criticized the majority's reasoning, stating that Matthews was un-
10. Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1977).
11. 64 Ark. 398, 406, 42 S.W. 902, 904-05 (1897).
12. Id. at 403, 42 S.W. at 903.
13. Id. at 404-05, 42 S.W. at 903-04.
14. Id. at 403, 42 S.W. at 903.
15. Id. at 406, 42 S.W. at 904-05.
16. 205 Ark. 990, 167 S.W.2d 895, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 738 (1943).
17. Id. at 991-92, 167 S.W.2d at 896.
18. Id. at 993-94, 167 S.W.2d at 897.
19. Id. at 997, 1001, 167 S.W. at 899, 901.
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sound and advocating overruling the requirement of mutuality in
employment contracts.20 The concurring justice found that the cru-
cial consideration is ascertaining the parties' intent in making the
agreement.2 1 He reasoned that it was improper to require any consid-
eration other than what the parties had demanded, or to incorporate a
doctrine into their contract that invalidated their agreement.
In 1982, in Griffin v. Erickson,22 the Arkansas Supreme Court
first indicated that it might consider enforcing a good cause provi-
sion 2 3 in an employment agreement even though the agreement did
not require the employee to work for a definite period. In Griffin, the
employee alleged that his employer discharged him in violation of a
good cause provision in the employer's "Statement of Management
Policy."'24 The trial court held that the discharge was not warranted
and ordered reinstatement with backpay.25 The Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed 26 and restated the mutuality doctrine as found in Mat-
thews.27  The court stated that it would not consider whether Mat-
thews controlled in the case before it because neither party made the
holding from Matthews an issue at trial.28
The issue of abrogating the requirement of mutuality as it affects
a good cause provision was again considered in Jackson v. Kinark
Corp.2 9  In Jackson the employee worked as a banquet server for a
hotel. The employer discharged the employee when he refused to sub-
20. Id. at 997, 167 S.W.2d at 899 (Carter, J., concurring); id. at 1001, 167 S.W.2d at 901
(Robins, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 999-1000, 167 S.W.2d at 900-01 (Carter, J., concurring). According to Justice
Carter, the doctrine of mutuality was formed by courts of equity to be applied in those in-
stances in which one party asked for specific performance of a contract. Specific performance
would not be granted absent mutual obligations. The doctrine was later adopted by courts to
determine whether a contract had been validly formed. This extension led to confusion and
improper decisions such as Matthews. Id. at 998, 167 S.W.2d at 899.
22. 277 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982).
23. Id. at 438-39, 642 S.W.2d at 311. Erickson, the plaintiff, was a professional employee
of the City of Little Rock, Arkansas. Employees of state and federal governments and those
with collective bargaining agreements are typically protected from discharge except for good
cause. Employees without express good cause provisions are protected in some jurisdictions by
courts which hold that a good cause or good faith requirement is implied in every employment
contract. These jurisdictions would thereby avoid the specific issue in Gladden. See, e.g., For-
tune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
24. 277 Ark. at 435-36, 642 S.W.2d at 309-10.
25. Id. at 435, 642 S.W.2d at 309.
26. Id. at 442, 642 S.W.2d at 313.
27. Id. at 437, 642 S.W.2d at 310 (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. v. Matthews,
64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902 (1897)).
28. Id. at 438, 642 S.W.2d at 311.
29. 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984).
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mit to a polygraph examination relating to the disappearance of a tele-
vision set at the hotel.3 ° The employee contended that his termination
amounted to a breach of contract and alleged that his dismissal was
wrongful and abusive, thereby creating liability in tort. The trial
court granted summary judgment with regard to the contract claim
because the employee was not employed for a definite term and could
be terminated at his employer's will. The employee took a nonsuit as
to the tort claim and sought review of the contract issue. The court of
appeals transferred the case to the supreme court as "presenting an
issue of significant public interest."' 3' Again, the Arkansas Supreme
Court was unwilling to decide the issue of whether an exception to the
doctrine of mutuality should be made given the particular facts.32
Although Arkansas has been termed a "caveat-employee" 33
state, the Arkansas Supreme Court has implied in employment con-
tracts a limited number of exceptions which favor the employee. In
Moline Lumber Co. v. Harrison,34 an Arkansas case decided in 1917,
the court reviewed the authorities35 regarding implied terms of dura-
tion. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with those authorities36
which favor the rule that when salary was expressed in terms of a
yearly, monthly, or weekly rate the hiring was for that period unless
other circumstances indicated a different intent. 37
The Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding in 1955 in
Miller v. Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. 38 In Miller the court held
that employment at a specified rate per year, month, or week may
tend to indicate that the employee was hired for that period, but
where no definite term of employment was specified, the employee
was subject to termination at the will of the employer.3 9 The court has
30. Id. at 549, 669 S.W.2d at 899.
31. Id.
32. The court remanded the case for further findings of fact. Id. at 550, 669 S.W.2d at
899.
33. Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 497 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
34. 128 Ark. 260, 194 S.W. 25 (1917).
35. Id. at 263, 194 S.W. at 26.
36. Id. See also Pollock v. Art Institute of Boston, 97 Ill. App. 3d 958, 423 N.E.2d 1043
(1981); Floyd v. Lamar Farrell Chevrolet, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 756, 285 S.E.2d 681 (1981):
McClure v. Leasco Computer, Inc., 134 Ga. App. 871, 216 S.E.2d 689 (1975). For a review of
modern cases following the minority rule see, e.g., Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 F.2d
385, 390 (10th Cir. 1931); Lowenstein v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 319 F.
Supp. 1096, 1098 (D. Mass. 1970).
37. 128 Ark. at 263-64, 194 S.W. at 26. The court reasoned in favor of this holding
because the use of a time period to describe compensation without other references to time
creates an inference that the parties intended to contract for that period. Id.
38. 225 Ark. 475, 283 S.W.2d 158 (1955).
39. Id. at 481, 283 S.W.2d at 161.
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also ruled that evidence which indicates the employer typically hires
persons of the same position for definite terms is relevant for consider-
ation by the jury.4°
Recent Arkansas cases presented the opportunity for the court to
recognize an employee policy manual or handbook as being incorpo-
rated in the employment contract. In Jackson v. Kinark Corp.41 the
employee asserted that his employee handbook constituted a definite
contract of employment because it provided that an employee who
completed a three month probationary period could be terminated
only for cause.42 The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that sum-
mary judgment for the employer was inappropriate because further
findings of fact were required to determine whether the employee
handbook was part of the employment contract.43
In Bryant v. Southern Screw Machine Products Co.,' the court
addressed a case in which an employee policy manual arguably pro-
vided the employee some protection from the at will rule.45 In Bryant
the employer discharged the employee for accepting money from a
vendor in return for an order for light bulbs.46 The jury found for the
employee on his allegation of wrongful discharge. The trial judge
granted the employer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
4 7
A court may imply terms in an employment contract to fulfill the
mutuality of obligation requirement. This implication makes provi-
sions in the contract, which favor the employee, enforceable. Arkan-
sas cases recognize few exceptions to the mutuality requirement. 4 In
Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Services, Inc. , a federal court decision on
Arkansas law, the court reasoned that since the Arkansas Supreme
Court has recognized exceptions to the employment at will doctrine,
it would recognize promissory estoppel as an exception to the mutual-
40. Arkadelphia Lumber v. Asman, 85 Ark. 568, 577, 107 S.W. 1171, 1173 (1907).
41. 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984).
42. Id. at 550, 669 S.W.2d at 899.
43. Id. at 550-51, 669 S.W.2d at 899.
44. 288 Ark. 602, 707 S.W.2d 321 (1986).
45. Id. at 603, 707 S.W.2d at 322.
46. Id. The employee handbook stated that employees would be eligible for all fringe
benefits after a 60 day probationary period. The handbook also stated the company would not
tolerate "dishonesty, cheating, willful negligence, theft, loafing during working time or insub-
ordination." Id. at 603-04, 707 S.W.2d at 322. This clause did not provide the appropriate
provisions the court desired in order to modify the at will rule.
47. Id. at 604, 707 S.W.2d at 322.
48. See Youngdahl, supra note 5.
49. 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
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ity requirement." This decision recognized estoppel as a substitute
for consideration to fulfill the requirement of mutuality of obligation.
This opinion also found that an implied in fact term requiring good
faith and fair dealing would be recognized in Arkansas if the parties
intended to include such a term in the agreement.5 The Arkansas
Supreme Court has apparently not addressed the issue of whether
promissory estoppel is sufficient to provide mutuality of obligation in
an employment contract.
Other states also protect employees from the employment at will
rule for reasons of public policy. 2 In the event of a discharge that
violates a public policy goal, the employee will be allowed to recover
on a theory of breach of contract or tort.53 Only in the past few years
has the Arkansas Supreme Court expressed a willingness to recognize
public policy exceptions to the employment at will doctrine.54 In
M.B.M. Co. v. Counce5" the court recognized that some matters of
public policy might be considered to provide relief on a theory of
breach of contract. The court stated that a public policy exception to
the at will rule might be recognized if the employee was discharged in
contravention of "a statutory right, or for performing a duty required
of her by law, or that the reason for the discharge was in violation of
some other well established public policy." '56
In determining the liability of the employer in Gladden v. Arkan-
sas Children's Hospital the Arkansas Supreme Court explained that
neither of the employees, Gladden nor Samples, presented a case in
which they had been discharged in violation of a matter of public
policy for which liability could be imposed under Counce.57 The
court also found that these cases did not present the issues outlined in
Southern Screw Machine as warranting review of the employment at
will doctrine because neither Gladden nor Samples were protected by
an express provision to terminate only for good cause.5 8
50. Id. at 494.
51. Id. at 494.
52. What constitutes a matter of public policy may be decided by the courts or be defined
by the legislature. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984).
53. M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 273, 596 S.W.2d 681, 684 (1980).
54. See Youngdahl, Wrongful Discharge of Employees Terminable at Will-A New Theory
of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REV. 729 (1981) for a synopsis of public policy exceptions
in Arkansas and other jurisdictions.
55. 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
56. 268 Ark. at 273, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
57. 292 Ark. 130, 135, 728 S.W.2d 501, 504 (1987) (citing M.B.M. v. Counce, 268 Ark.
269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1981)).
58. Id. at 135, 728 S.W.2d at 505 (citing Bryant v. Southern Screw Machine Co., 288 Ark.
602, 707 S.W.2d 321 (1986)). See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
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Although the court did not recognize any implied terms in these
employment agreements, 59 it did choose to modify the at will doc-
trine. The court called the rule from Matthews "outmoded and un-
tenable."6  The court reasoned that where the employment
agreement states that the employee will not be discharged except for
cause, the employee should not be terminated without cause simply
because the employment was for an indefinite term.61
The court admitted that Jackson 62 may have suggested that a
good cause provision might be implied by the courts into an employ-
ment agreement. 63 However, this inference was firmly rejected. The
court was apparently concerned that allowing implied terms would
lead lower courts to impose liability on the employer by adding terms
to the agreement whenever an employee is discharged.' 4
In summary, the Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned in Gladden
that the employment at will doctrine in Arkansas as applied to ex-
press good cause provisions was inequitable. The court lessened the
harshness of the doctrine by allowing an employee who had a good
cause provision in his contract to recover for breach of contract. An
employee who has such a provision in his employee policy manual
may now establish that he relied on that provision and recover for
breach of contract. However, the court refused to go to the extreme
of implying such a provision where none expressly exists.
Gladden is significant in three respects. First, the announcement
that the court will enforce express good cause provisions in contracts
gives effect to the intent of the parties in making their agreement.
This was the position urged by the concurring justice in Petty65 in
1943. This modification is equitable for both parties to the agreement.
Before Gladden, an employer could promise an employee employment
without termination except for valid reasons and subsequently termi-
nate for no reason at all. It was deceptive for the employer to make
such a promise and be protected by an archaic rule that the employee
Discharge. The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARVARD L. REV. 1816 (1980) for
arguments in favor of courts implying the contractual right of the employer only to terminate
in good faith.
59. 292 Ark. at 136, 728 S.W.2d at 505.
60. Id. (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902
(1897)).
61. 292 Ark. at 136, 728 S.W.2d at 505.
62. 282 Ark. at 550, 669 S.W.2d at 899.
63. 292 Ark. at 136, 728 S.W.2d at 505.
64. Id.
65. Petty v. Mo. & Ark. Ry., 205 Ark. 990, 999, 167 S.W.2d 895, 900 (1943) (Carter, J.,
concurring).
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could not have envisioned existed. It is interesting to note that the
court chose to modify the doctrine even though neither employee in
Gladden had a good cause provision in their contract. The court ap-
parently felt that those considerations of fairness which were advo-
cated in Petty are more important than the inequitable precedent of
Matthews.
Second, the court reaffirmed its position against providing an im-
plied good cause provision. This decision appropriately limits the ob-
ligations of the parties to the promises expressly contained in the
written agreement. This position was advocated by the concurrence
in Petty when it argued that courts should mold the law to facilitate
the business affairs of the public.6 6
Third, the Gladden opinion does not merge the employment con-
tract and employee handbooks or policy manuals into a single con-
tract. The opinion states that an employee who "relies upon a
personnel manual that contains an express provision against termina-
tion except for cause ... may not be arbitraily discharged in violation
of such a provision."67 An employee who does not have an express
good cause provision in his employment contract must therefore es-
tablish some reliance upon the express terms of the policy manual. It
is difficult to imagine how an employee could rely upon a good cause
provision in his policy manual or handbook before he has been termi-
nated. It seems that every employee who has been discharged would
be capable of establishing the same reliance as any other employee
who had been similarly discharged. The court will undoubtedly refine
this statement in subsequent opinions.
The employer remains free to terminate at his discretion without
breaching the contract of employment if the agreement has no definite
period, the contract contains no express provision relating to termina-
tion only for good cause, the employee policy manual contains no re-
quirement of termination only for good cause (or if it does the
employee has not relied upon that provision), and the employer does
not violate a public policy exception 68 to the employment at will rule.
The Arkansas Supreme Court appears reluctant to abandon the em-
ployment at will doctrine although Gladden does create an exception
to the general rule. An employee's advocate may find the legislature69
66. Id.
67. 292 Ark. at 136, 728 S.W.2d at 505.
68. Youngdahl, supra note 54, at 729.
69. See generally Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the
Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979) which advocates modification of the at will rule by the judicial
and legislative branches of government.
1987-88]
402 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:393
more willing to provide greater protection for the employee than the
judiciary.
As a practical matter this decision creates the potential for liabil-
ity for breach of contract where express good cause provisions exist in
employment contracts or employee handbooks or policy manuals.
Because the court refused to merge the policy manual or handbook
into the employment agreement, the employer should be capable of
eliminating good cause terms in existing handbooks without the as-
sent of the employee. However, a change in the terms of an existing
contract requires the mutual assent of the parties before the elimina-
tion of such a term would be effective.
Todd A. Lewellen
